Balancing the Demands of the Workplace with the Needs of the Modern Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect Domestic Partners by Menashe Glassman, Kimberly
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 37
2004 
Balancing the Demands of the Workplace with the Needs of the 
Modern Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect 
Domestic Partners 
Kimberly Menashe Glassman 
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Labor and Employment Law 
Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Balancing the Demands of the Workplace with the Needs of the Modern 
Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect Domestic Partners, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 837 
(2004). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol37/iss3/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
BALANCING THE DEMANDS OF THE WORKPLACE
WITH THE NEEDS OF THE MODERN FAMILY:
EXPANDING FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE TO
PROTECT DOMESTIC PARTNERS
Kimberly Menashe Glassman*
This Note addresses the importance of expanding the federal Family and Medical
Leave Act and state family and medical leave laws to protect domestic partners.
Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act to allow workers to balance
their work lives and family lives by granting workers the right to take leave time to
care for an immediate family member in times of medical necessity. The term 'fam-
ily member," however, is generally limited to relation y blood, adoption, or
marriage, and does not include an individual's domestic partner. The concept of
family has evolved in our legal system and is no longer limited by traditional no-
tions of the family. Same and opposite sex unmarried partners have all of the
appearances of marriage and should be granted the right and ability to care for
one another when one partner is facing a medical emergency.
In recent years, many jurisdictions have begun to provide some of the legal benefits
of marriage to domestic partners who live together, are financially interdependent,
and generally act as married couples would act. Few states, however, have pro-
vided domestic partners with protection under state family and medical leave laws.
This Note argues that family and medical leave benefits should be among the
rights extended to unmarried partners and proposes a model to achieve this goal.
This Note recounts personal stories from domestic partners who were unable to use
family leave time to care for their partners, reviews the benefits provided in existing
family and medical leave laws that include domestic partners, and recommends
elements that a model family and medical leave act should include. The federal
government, a state, or a local government might follow this guidance to craft a
family and medical leave statute that permits employees to use leave time to care
for their domestic partners.
Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in
1993 to allow employees "to balance the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families."' The FMLA provides an important
benefit to workers: the right and ability to care for one's immediate
family members in times of medical necessity without fear of losing
one's job. While the FMLA permits employees to take up to twelve
* B.A. 2000, State University of New York College at Geneseo; J.D. and Certificate in
Public Policy 2003, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author
would like to thank her husband, Jamie, and her family for all of their support, and
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1. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (b) (1) (2002).
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weeks of unpaid leave to care for a family member with a serious
health condition, the term "family member" does not include an
individual's domestic partner.2 As a general definition, domestic
partners are two adults who live together in a committed and inter-
dependent relationship, and, in some jurisdictions, enter into legally
recognized relationships by meeting statutory requirements.3 Do-
mestic partners generally have all of the appearances of a marriage-
relationship, except that they are not legally married. Because most
family and medical leave laws do not include domestic partners, gay
and lesbian couples who are precluded from getting married under
state law and opposite sex couples who opt not to get married have
no right to invoke the protection of these laws to care for their do-
mestic partners in times of medical necessity.4
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (C) (2002) (permitting leave to care for a "spouse, or a son,
daughter or parent" with a serious health condition).
3. Some state laws use different terms to refer to domestic partners. For example,
Hawaii provides benefits to same-sex couples who register as reciprocal beneficiaries and
Vermont permits same-sex partners to enter into civil unions. HAw. REv. STAT. § 572C-4
(Michie 1999) (defining reciprocal beneficiaries as unmarried adults legally prohibited
from marrying one another); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002) (providing parties to a
civil union with all of the benefits that married persons are entitled to under state law). Both
Hawaii and Vermont require that the couples register as reciprocal beneficiaries or enter
into valid civil unions before they can obtain the benefits of the respective state laws. For
purposes of this Note, the term "domestic partner" includes reciprocal beneficiaries and
parties to civil unions, regardless of gender or sexual orientation.
4. No state currently permits same-sex couples to marry. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
(HRC), THE STATE OF THE FAMILY: LAWS AND LEGISLATION AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN, BI-
SEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILIES 3 (2002). However, in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that
"barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely
because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Consti-
tution." Id. at 969. The court then stayed the judgment for 180 days to allow the
Massachusetts legislature to take appropriate action in light of the decision. Id. at 970. In
response to an inquiry from the Massachusetts Senate, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court issued an opinion on February 3, 2004, stating that creating a separate civil union
system for same-sex couples would not meet the mandates of the Massachusetts Constitution
set forth in Goodridge. Opinions of the justices to the Senate, SJC-09163 (Mass. Feb. 3, 2004).
Members of the Massachusetts Senate had introduced a bill to enact create civil unions and
include parties to a civil union in "any definition or use of the terms 'spouse,' 'family,' 'im-
mediate family,' 'dependent,' 'next of kin,' 'husband,' 'wife,' and other terms that denote
the spousal relationship." S. 2175, 183rd Gen. Court ch. 207A, § 4 (c) (Mass. 2003). The
Supreme Judicial Court stated that "segregating same-sex unions ... cannot possibly be held
rationally to advance or 'preserve' what we stated in Goodridge were the Commonwealth's
legitimate interests in procreation, child rearing, and the conservation of resources.... The
history of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal." Opinions of
the justices to the Senate, SJC-09163 (Mass. Feb. 3, 2004). Based on this opinion, same-sex
couples may be able to get married beginning May 17, 2004, 180 days after the Goodridge
decision. Id. At the same time, members of the Massachusetts House of Representatives and
Senate jointly introduced a measure to amend the Massachusetts Constitution to read that
"only the union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in
Massachusetts." H. 190, 183rd Gen. Court (Mass. 2003). Amending the Massachusetts Con-
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Imagine this scenario: John and Mary have been married for
twenty-five years. John works at a large corporation and Mary is a
teacher. Mary was recently diagnosed with cancer and needs to un-
dergo chemotherapy and radiation treatments. Because of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, John can take time off from work to
take care of Mary as she undergoes cancer treatment. John can be
by her side at the hospital and not have to worry about his job se-
curity. Now replace Mary with Mark. Imagine that John and Mark
have been living together for twenty-five years in a committed rela-
tionship. They share all living expenses, are the beneficiaries in
one another's wills and other legal documents, and all of their
friends and family treat John and Mark as if they are married. Be-
cause the Family and Medical Leave Act and most state family and
medical leave laws do not include domestic partners as family
members, John cannot use family medical leave to care for Mark as
he undergoes cancer treatment. Instead, John has to rely on the
kindness of his employer to permit him to take the time to be by
Mark's side while he is at the hospital. John and Mark's relation-
ship is very much like John and Mary's, yet in the latter scenario
John is left without the protection of the law.
Though some consider "family" to be limited to relation by
blood, adoption, or marriage, the modern American family is no
longer bound by these limits. State governments, local govern-
ments, and courts have recognized that many couples function as
families because they live together in relationships that have all of
the appearances of marriage without being legally married. In re-
cent years, many jurisdictions have begun to provide some of the
legal benefits of marriage to same- and opposite-sex domestic part-
ners who live together, are financially interdependent, and
generally act as married couples would act.5 The federal
stitution would require two successive votes in the Legislature that would then be subject to
a statewide vote-meaning that the constitution cannot be amended until at least 2006. See
Terence Neilan, Gays Have Full Marriage Rights, Massachusetts Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2004 at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/04/national/04CND-Mass.html (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Once same-sex couples are able to get mar-
ried in Massachusetts, then they would be able to benefit from all state laws that relate to
marriage, including the Massachusetts Family and Medical Leave Law. See MASS; GEN. LAWS
ch. 149, § 52D (2003). However, even if same-sex marriages remain legal in Massachusetts,
other states will not have to recognize same-sex marriages that are entered into in Massachu-
setts, because of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). DOMA provides that "no
state, territory, or possession of the United States ... shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, orjudicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession or [Indian]
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
." 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2002).
5. See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-701, et. seq. (2001) (creating the Washington, D.C.
domestic partnership registry, which provides registered domestic partners with some
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government, state, and local governments should continue this
trend by expanding family and medical leave laws to include do-
6
mestic partners.
The important policy considerations behind the FMLA-stability,
economic security and preserving family integrity-apply equally to
all couples who maintain marriage-like family relationships. In the
108th Congress, Representative Caroline Maloney proposed H.R.
1430, which would amend the FMLA to allow leave to care for "a
domestic partner, parent-in-law, adult child, sibling, grandparent, or
parent" with a serious health condition. This would provide essen-
tial benefits to a wider class of family members.8
In addition, since Congress passed the FMLA in 1993, several
states and the District of Columbia passed or amended their own
family and medical leave laws to include domestic partners as im-
mediate family members. Hawaii, Vermont, the District of
Columbia, Oregon, and California permit employees to use their
leave time to care for domestic partners with serious health condi-
tions.9 Like the FMLA, these statutes apply to both public and
benefits of marriage). Under the Health Care Benefits Expansion Act, all health care facili-
ties must consider a patient's domestic partner to be a family member for purpose of
visitation and making medical decisions. D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-704 (2001). In addition,
District government employees may take leave time to care for a domestic partner or the
child of a domestic partner, funeral leave to attend a memorial service for a domestic part-
ner, and leave time when either the employee or his or her domestic partner adopts a child.
D.C. CODE. ANN. § 32-705(a)-(d) (2001).
6. NewJersey, for example, recently enacted the Domestic Partnership Act, which ex-
tends limited benefits to same and opposite sex couples that register as domestic partners.
2003 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 246 (West). Although this law provides many benefits to registered
domestic partners-including statutory protection under anti-discrimination laws that pro-
hibit discrimination based on domestic partnership status in employment, housing and
credit discrimination; visitation rights for a hospitalized domestic partner; the right to make
medical or legal decisions for an incapacitated partner; and an additional personal exemp-
tion under the NewJersey Income Tax laws-this new law does not amend the definition of
"family member" in the New Jersey Family Leave Act. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:1lB-3(j) (2003).
The term "family member" in the Family Leave Act continues to mean "a child, parent, or
spouse." Id. Domestic partners who register pursuant to this new law will not be able to use
family leave time to care for one another if one partner has a serious health condition. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:11B-4(a) (2003). See also 2003 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 246 (West).
7. Family and Medical Leave Inclusion Act, H.R. 1430, 108th Cong. 2003. This bill
also seeks to amend 5 U.S.C. § 6382 to provide this benefit to federal employees. Represen-
tative Maloney first sponsored this measure in 2002. See To Amend the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, H.R. 2287, 107th Cong. (2002).
8. H.R. 1430. This proposed amendment to FMIA does not define domestic partner
or indicate whether the term is limited to same-sex partners or includes same and opposite-
sex domestic partners. Part VII addresses the issue of how to define domestic partners. See
infra notes 128-51 and accompanying text.
9. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 398-3 (Michie 1999) (entitling an employee to up to four
weeks of leave to care for a child, spouse, reciprocal beneficiary, or parent with a serious
health condition); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002) (providing that parties to a civil
union are entitled to family leave benefits); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472 (2002) (providing
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private employers. Most of these jurisdictions limit the definition of
domestic partner to a same-sex partner. ° In addition, Delaware
permits state employees to use their sick leave time to care for a
domestic partner with a catastrophic illness." While a few states
have taken action to protect domestic partners and a bill was in-
troduced in the 108th Congress, in most states domestic partners
are without legal protection of their jobs if they need leave to care
for one another.
The purposes of this Note are (1) to analyze the reasons to
include domestic partners in a family medical leave plan and (2) to
propose a model for accomplishing this goal. Part I examines the
purposes and history of the Family and Medical Leave Act and
shows how those purposes apply to domestic partners. Part II
explores how family is currently defined under the law and
analyzes whether domestic partners can fit under a modern
definition of family. Part III discusses why family and medical leave
laws should be expanded by presenting personal stories of
individuals who were unable to use family and medical leave. Part
IV addresses the main arguments against expanding family and
medical leave: that granting rights of marriage to unmarried persons
will erode the institution of marriage, and that expanding family
and medical leave will be too costly. Part V analyzes the
constitutional issues that arise when a jurisdiction limits its domestic
partner benefits to same-sex domestic partners, and concludes that
doing so does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Part VI
discusses the benefits provided by existing family and medical leave
laws that include domestic partners. Finally, Part VII uses the statutes
discussed in Section VI to recommend elements a model family and
up to twelve weeks of leave in a twelve month period to care for a family member with a
serious illness); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-502 (2001) (providing up to 16 workweeks of family
leave during any 24 month period to care for a family member with a serious health condi-
tion); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-501 (2001) (defining family member to include "a person with
whom the employee shares or has shared, within the last year, a mutual residence and with
whom the employee maintains a committed relationship"); OR. REv. STAT. § 659A.159
(2002) (allowing leave to care for a family member with a serious health condition); OR.
ADMIN. R. 839-009-0210 (2002) (defining family member to include a same-sex domestic
partner); 2002 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 901 (Deering 2002) (establishing up to six weeks of paid
leave to care for a family member with a serious health condition, including a domestic
partner).
10. Of these jurisdictions, only the District of Columbia statute defines domestic part-
ners to include both same- and opposite-sex couples. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-501 (2001).
Hawaii, Vermont, California, and Oregon limit the definition of domestic partner to same-
sex couples who are unable to get married under state law. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572C-
4 (Michie 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002); 2002 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 901 (Deer-
ing 2002); OR. ADMIN. R. 839-009-0210 (2002).
11. DEL. CODE REGS. 10-450-002 (2002).
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medical leave law should include. The federal government, a state,
or local government might follow this guidance to craft a family
and medical leave statute that permits employees to use the leave
time to care for their domestic partners.
I. PURPOSES OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
A. Statutory Purposes and Legislative History of the
Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993 to
"promote the stability and economic security of families, and to
promote national interests in preserving family integrity."02 When
President Clinton signed the FMLA, he stated:
It is only when workers can count on a commitment from
their employer that they can make their own full commit-
ments to theirjobs... . When businesses do not give workers
leave for family needs, they fail to establish a working envi-
ronment that can promote heightened productivity, lessened
job turnover, and reduced absenteeism. 13
The legislative history indicates that Congress passed the FMLA to
prevent employees from having to choose between their jobs and
their families. Congressman Ford stated that, "Workers should not
be forced to stay on the job when they are needed at home to help
a mother with a broken hip, a husband going for chemotherapy, or
,014a child facing surgery.
In addition, Congressman Gutierrez stated, "It seems like an
idea that is self-evident-that in America your family comes first.
That taking care of your loved ones comes first. That our Nation is
strong enough and generous enough that we can allow our people
to put their family before work every, now and then." 15 These
statements reveal the significance of the FMLA. For the first time,
the United States passed a law that permitted employees to attend
to important family needs without the fear that they would lose
12. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2002).
13. Statement on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 144, 145 (Feb. 5, 1993). ...
14. 139 CONG. REC. 265 (1993) (statement of Rep. Ford).
15. 139 CONG. REc. 1959 (1993) (statement of Rep. Gutierrez).
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their jobs. When President Clinton signed the Family and Medical
Leave Act, he said:
As a rising number of American workers must deal with the
dual pressures of family and job, the failure to accommodate
these workers with adequate family and medical leave policies
has forced too many Americans to choose between their job
security and family emergencies.... It is neither fair nor nec-
essary to ask working Americans to choose between their jobs
and their families-between continuing their employment
and tending to their own health or to vital needs at home.' 6
B. Extending Family and Medical Leave Benefits to Domestic Partners
Meets the Legislative Goals of Family and Medical Leave Laws
"[I] t is neither fair nor necessary" to force domestic partners to
choose between job security and their families. Providing broader
coverage under the FMLA and state and local laws will prevent
domestic partners from being forced to make this choice. It will
allow domestic partners to rely on laws that recognize and protect
their families rather than relying on the kindness of their individ-
ual employers. 8 Expanding family and medical leave laws at the
16. Statement on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 144, 145 (Feb. 5, 1993).
17. See id.
18. Some private employers provide their employees with domestic partner benefits
that include family and medical leave time. See, e.g., HRC, IMATION: 2001 DOMESTIC PART-
NER INFORMATION (providing that employees may take time off from work, as needed, to
attend to a domestic partner with a serious health condition), available at http:
//www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=TheIssues&CONTENTID=5338&TEMPLATE=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform); HRC, HEWLETT-PACKARD Co.-DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS
PROGRAM (providing "up to 12 weeks per year of unpaid, job-protected time off to care
for a domestic partner with a serious health condition"), available at http://
www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=TheIssues&CONTENTID=5338&TEMPLATE=/Con
tentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform); Benefits (AT&T provides leave of absence plans that include "Family Care
Leave", permifting employees to use this leave to care for their domestic partners.), avail-
able at http://www.att.com/hr/life/benefits.htl (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). These employers have chosen to provide some of the benefits tra-
ditionally reserved to married employees to employees in domestic partnership
relationships. Other employers that provide similar leave benefits include Nike, Kodak,
Bausch & Lomb, and British Petroleum. See also infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text
(text of interviews with employees who were not covered by their state or the FMLA, but
were able to take time to care for their partners because their employers' policies). For a
more complete list of private corporations that provide domestic partner benefits, see the
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federal, state, and local levels will effectuate the purposes of these
laws. Doing so will promote the stability and economic security of
the modern American family.
In the 2000 census, 5,475,768 individuals reported living in un-
married-partner households. 9 Of those, 594,391 individuals (10.85
percent) reported living with a same-sex partner.20 The 2000 census
revealed that gay and lesbian families live in 99.3 percent of all
counties in the United States.' Policy makers cannot continue to
ignore the existence of unmarried-partner families and should
recognize the need to provide them with protections under the
law. Since same-sex partners cannot legally get married in any state,
the only way to guarantee them the right to use family and medical
leave to care for their partners is to amend these laws to include
domestic partners. Since most states exclude opposite-sex domestic
partners coverage from family and medical leave laws, those cou-
ples will remain unprotected as long as the laws are not changed.
Domestic partners face similar pressures and have similar needs to
married couples: to care for their partners in times of medical ne-
cessity and be secure in their jobs during these times of need.
Federal, state and local laws should recognize these functional
families in their family and medical leave laws.
II. THE CHANGING FACE OF THE MODERN
AMERICAN FAMILY
A. Legal Recognition of the Functional Family
Since the 1970s, courts have begun to recognize the concept of
the "functional family." These courts acknowledge that partners
with emotional and economic interdependence, though unmar-
ried, can be in familial relationships.22 Elements of a functional
Human Rights Campaign Foundation's Workplace Policies Advanced Search, available at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search-the Database&Template=/CustomSour
ce/WorkNet/WorkplacePolicySearchAdvanced.cfm (searchable database of both public and
private employers that provide domestic partner benefits).
19. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS BY SEX OF PARTNERS-
DATA SET: CENSUS 2000, 100-PERCENT DATA, available at http://factfinder.census.gov (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
20. Id.
21. DAVID M. SMITH & GARY J. GATES, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF 2000
UNITED STATES CENSUS DATA A HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN REPORT 3 (2002).
22. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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family generally include protecting the physical health and safety
of one another; providing for "shelter, food, clothing, health care,
and economic sustenance"; being economically interdependent;
offering means for emotional support and growth; helping to
shape goals and a value structure; and creating a place to recuper-
ate "from external stresses."2  These elements look at how the
partners function rather than relying on the existence of a legal
marriage to determine whether a family exists.
In the 1976 Marvin v. Marvin opinion, the California Supreme
Court recognized "the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in
modern society and the social acceptance of them," and held that
the courts can enforce contracts made between unmarried cohabi-
tating couples to provide benefits to one another.4 Although
Marvin only dealt with whether courts could enforce agreements
between cohabiting couples, in 1987, the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin enforced an implied contract between non-marital partners
who had lived together for twelve years and who had two children
in Watts v. Watts.25 The court found that the parties intended to
share the property acquired during their relationship as a husband
and wife would. The court held that an unmarried cohabitant may
assert contract and property claims against the other upon dissolu-
tion of the relationship.26 Marvin and Watts focused on opposite-sex
couples. These cases recognize that individuals who live together
outside of marriage can live in family relationships and that those
relations can be the basis for legal obligations.
Recognizing the functional family is good public policy. Society
benefits when individuals have both emotional and economic sup-
port, which often come from the family. Commentator Andrew
23. Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family", 26 GONZ. L.
REV. 91, 97 (1990/1991). See also HRC, KODAK DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS available at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Secion=The-Issues&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=11093 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) (providing benefits to employees in a "spouse-like" relationship, defined as
individuals who are "emotionally committed to one another and are jointly responsible for
the common welfare and financial obligations of the household").
24. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122. Before Marvin, agreements between cohabiting couples
were found void because courts viewed them as contracts for the performance of sexual
services. Id.
25. 405 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Wis. 1987).
26. Id. at 310, 313 (inferring that holdingjoint bank accounts, making joint purchases,
filing joint tax returns, and being listed as husband and wife on other legal documents indi-
cated that the parties intended to share equally). The court also found that the woman
could assert a claim for unjust enrichment. Id. at 314 (stating "that unmarried cohabitants
may raise claims based upon unjust enrichment following the termination of their relation-
ships where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of the property
acquired through the efforts of both").
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Sullivan explains: "Marriage provides an anchor ... It provides a
mechanism for emotional stability, economic security, and healthy
rearing of the next generation."27 Studies show that married cou-
ples "live longer, are healthier, earn more, have lower rates of
substance abuse and mental illness, are less likely to commit sui-
cide, and report higher levels of happiness," and that marriage
"confer[s] economies of scale and of joint consumption, mini-
mize[s] sexually transmitted disease, and provides a stable and
nourishing framework for child rearing."28 If the stability of mar-
riage and family provides these benefits, then expanding the legal
benefits of marriage to functional families will improve their stabil-
ity, and make them happier and healthier as well.
B. Same-sex Partners as Functional Families
In recent years, state and local governments have begun to ex-
tend some of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples. These
benefits vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Examples of such
benefits include protection under rent control laws, access to the
adoption procedures used by stepparents (second-parent adop-
tion), health care coverage, medical decision-making authority, the
right to visit partners in the hospital, state tax advantages, use of
family medical leave to care for partners or their children, the abil-
ity to inherit property without a will, property rights such as joint
tenancy, and the ability to take a partner's surname.29
27. Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay Marriage, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20.
28. Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 251 E3d 604, 607 (2001) (citing LINDAJ. WAITE
& MARIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER,
HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER:
COMPELLING ,NEw EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR
THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY (1996); George W. Dent,Jr., The Defense of Traditional
Marriage, 15J.L. & POL'Y 581 (1999)).
29. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (rent control); in-
fra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (second-parent adoption); 2003 N.J. Sess. Law Serv.
246 (West); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-704 (2001) (hospital visitation); infra Appendix (family
and medical leave); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(1),(3),(14) (2002) (property law, pro-
bate law, taxes); In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002) (surname). In Bicknell, two
women sought to change their surnames to a name that was a combination of letters from
both of their last names so that they and their unborn child by artificial insemination would
have the same last name in their family relationship. Id. at 847. Since the women did not
seek to create the appearance of an Ohio sanctioned marriage, or intend a fraudulent pur-
pose or to evade creditors, the court held that the women had complied with the statutory
requirements and granted the name change. Id. at 849.
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One example is the case of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co..3 In
Braschi, the New York Court of Appeals held that the appellant
could seek protection from eviction under the New York City Rent
and Eviction Regulation 31 Under the New York City rent control
regulation, after the legal tenant died, only a surviving spouse or
other family member of the deceased tenant was entitled to
continue living in the apartment at the same price.32 If the tenant
lived with someone other than a spouse or immediate family
member, the landlord could evict that individual and then raise the
rent if the individual wanted to remain in the apartment. 33 The
court found that Braschi and his same-sex partner "lived together
as life partners for more than ten years," and that the property
owner could not evict Braschi's partner.' The court stated:
The intended protection against sudden eviction should not
rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but in-
stead should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In
the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally
valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emo-
tional and financial commitment and interdependence. This
view comports both with our society's traditional concept of
"family" and with the expectations of -individuals who live in
such nuclear units.
5
The New York Court of Appeals recognized that the policy be-
hind the rent control law, protecting the surviving spouse from
eviction, could apply to same-sex couples that acted as married
couples would act.36 In response, New York City amended its rent
control ordinance, providing a list of eight factors used to establish
whether a family exists, including:
(1) the longevity of the relationship; (2) sharing of household
and family expenses; (3) intermingling of finances...;
(4) engaging in family-type activities such asjointly attending
family functions and social and recreational activities;
(5) formalizing of legal obligations and responsibilities to
30. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
.31. Id. at 53-54.
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id. at 53.
34. Id. at 55.
35. Id. at 53-54.
36. Id. at 54.
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each other by executing wills naming each other as executor
and beneficiary, conferring upon each other the authority to
make health care decisions, and making a domestic partner
declaration; (6) holding themselves out as family members to
other family members and society in general; (7) regularly
performing family functions such as caring for each other or
each other's extended family members; and (8) engaging in
any other action which evidences the intention of creating a
long-term emotionally-committed relationship.37
Some states have also recognized same-sex couples as families
through second-parent adoption. Second-parent adoption permits
a second parent, such as a same-sex partner, to adopt the child
without the first parent losing any parental rights. 3s As a result, that
child has two legal parents: the biological or adoptive parent and
his or her partner.3 9 The state also typically grants adoptive parents
the same rights as biological parents in custody and visitation mat-
ters upon dissolution of the relationship."° California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ver-
mont, and Washington, D.C., permit second-parent adoption.4t
When the partner of a biological or adoptive parent becomes a le-
gal second parent to the child, a legal family unit exists between
37. David G. Richardson, Family Rights for Unmarried Couples, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
117, 120 (1993) (citation omitted).
38. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 41.
40. In addition, some states grant visitation rights to "de facto" parents even without
second-parent adoption. De facto parent status allows a non-legal parent to seek visitation by
showing that the legal parent consented to the non-legal parent's relationship with the
child; the non-legal parent lived with the child; the non-legal parent assumed parental re-
sponsibilities and obligations; or the non-legal parent has filled a parental role for a
substantial part of the child's life. See Lapsina-Williams v. Laspina-Williams, 742 A.2d 840
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that the former same-sex partner of the biological mother
had standing to petition for visitation of the biological mother's children after the couple
broke up). Under Connecticut law, a person can seek visitation "when the minor child's
family life has been disrupted in a [particular] manner." Id. at 843. The court found that the
separation of a nontraditional family constituted a disruption of the family sufficient to
permit the ex-partner to seek visitation. Id. at 843-44.
41. HRC, SECOND PARENT ADOPTION, available at http://www.hrc.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/Family/GetInformedl/Parenting/Adoption/Second-Parent Adoption/
SecondParent.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also
Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003); In re Olivia M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill.
App. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In reAdoption of Two Chil-
dren by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Adoption of Child by
J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995);
In reAdoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-302 (2001); In re M.M.D.,
662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
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the same-sex parents and the child.42 For example, in In rejacob, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the lesbian partner of a
child's mother could adopt the child without cutting off the
mother's parental rights.43 The court found that permitting the
second-parent adoption was in the best interests of the child. The
court stated that allowing the adoption provided:
the emotional security of knowing that in the event of the bio-
logical parent's death or disability, the other parent will have
presumptive custody, and the children's relationship with
their parents, siblings and other relatives will continue should
the coparents separate. Indeed, viewed from the children's
perspective, permitting the adoptions allows the children to
achieve a measure of permanency ....
The court recognized that it was in the best interests of the child to
have two legal parents and live in a family unit, recognizing the
same-sex couple as a family.
In addition to second-parent adoptions, many state and local
governments have enacted domestic partnership registries. These
registries extend to domestic partners some of the legal benefits
that are typically reserved to spouses. Vermont went a step further
in 2000 when it became the first state to recognize civil unions.
When couples enter into civil unions, they obtain the same protec-
tions, benefits, and responsibilities that married couples receive
under Vermont law. This Part discusses three of domestic partner-
ship systems: those used in Hawaii, Vermont, and Washington,
D.C.
45
Hawaii enacted the reciprocal beneficiaries system in 1997. This
system extends some of the benefits of marriage to same-sex cou-
ples who register as reciprocal beneficiaries. In doing so, the
Hawaii legislature recognized that "there are many individuals who
have significant personal, emotional, and economic relationships
with another individual yet are prohibited ... from marrying."
6
This system grants reciprocal beneficiaries property rights, the
right to visit a partner in a hospital and make health care decisions
42. Second Parent Adoption, supra note 41.
43. 660 N.E.2d at 398.
44. Id. at 399.
45. In addition to the three systems discussed, former California Governor Gray Davis
signed A.B. No. 205 into law. This law, which takes effect in 2007, provides that same-sex
domestic partners "shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject
to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law" as married persons. A.B. 205,
2003 Leg., ch. 421 § 4 (Cal. 2003).
46. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-2 (Michie 1999).
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for her or him, the ability to inherit property without a will, protec-
tion under Hawaii's domestic violence laws, and the ability to use
family leave time to care for a reciprocal beneficiary with a serious
health condition. With the exception of protection under the
domestic violence laws, all these benefits had previously been re-
served to married couples.
In Vermont, parties to a civil union are entitled to "all the same
benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law ... as are
granted to spouses in a marriage. '' 48 The Vermont statute provides a
nonexclusive list of legal benefits that apply to parties to a civil un-
ion, including:
Laws relating to tile, intestate succession, survivorship, and
waiver of will; causes of action related to or dependent upon
spousal status; probate law and procedure; adoption law and
procedure; group insurance for state employees; spouse abuse
programs; prohibitions against discrimination based on marital
status; victim's compensation rights; workers' compensation
benefits; laws relating to emergency and nonemergency medi-
cal care, hospital visitation and notification; terminal care
documents and durable power of attorney for health care exe-
cution and revocation; family leave benefits; public assistance
benefits; laws relating to state or municipal taxes; laws relating
to immunity from compelled testimony; homestead rights of a
surviving spouse; laws relating to loans to veterans; the defini-
tion of family farmer; laws relating to anatomical gifts; state
pay for military service; application for early voter absentee
ballot; family landowner rights to fish and hunt; legal re-
quirements for assignment of wages; and affirmance of
relationship.49
The rights afforded in the civil union statute acknowledge the
marriage-like and familial relationship that exists among same-sex
partners. Civil unions are an alternate system to marriage; they
provide a means for same-sex partners to obtain the legal benefits
of marriage. Vermont is the only state to recognize civil unions and
47. Id.
48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002) (emphasis added). The Vermont Civil Un-
ion statute provides benefits that come closest to marriage. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1204(b)-(e) (2002). However, since civil unions are not recognized outside of the state of
Vermont, the benefits are limited to couples who live in that state. This is unlike marriage,
where a valid marriage is generally recognized in every state regardless of where the parties
entered into the marriage.
49. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,.§ 1204(e) (1)-(24) (2002).
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thus far, no other state has recognized the validity of a Vermont
civil union except in the context of dissolving the union. 5°
The Washington, D.C., registry system is unique. It does not
limit the definition of domestic partners to individuals who cannot
get married, but includes both same and opposite sex partners.
Washington, D.C., defines a domestic partner as "a person with
whom an individual maintains a committed relationship." The
statute defines "committed relationship" as "a familial relationship
between [two] individuals characterized by mutual caring and the
sharing of a mutual residence." 5' The Washington, D.C., registry
provides domestic partners with the power to make health care de-
cisions for one another and the ability to visit one another in the
hospital, and permits domestic partners to use family and medical
leave to care for one another.
2
This evolving acceptance of same-sex couples is redefining
American family law. 3 These changes in state law afford same-sex
couples with the legal protections that are ordinarily associated
with mariage, and acknowledge that they are valid family relation-
ships. This trend should grow to include family and medical leave
laws.
50. Three couples have attempted to dissolve civil unions that they formed in Vermont
in other states. Two courts granted the request and the other did not. A Texas court granted
a same-sex couple that entered into a civil union in Vermont a "divorce" in Texas. Molly
McDonough, Court Oks Divorce without Recognizing 'Marriage'. Gay Couple's Civil Union, Created
in Vermont, is Dissolved in 7xas, A.B.A. J. EREPoRT, Mar. 21, 2003, at http://gaylaw.net/
news.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform); Sarah Schweitzer,
Civil Unions in Vermont Easier to Enter Than Exit, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 15, 2002)at Al. An
Iowa judge granted a divorce to a lesbian couple in 2003, stating that at the time he signed
the order, he did not realize that the petition was from a same-sex couple. Nonetheless, the
judge let the decision stand once he realized that he granted a divorce to a same-sex couple.
lowa Judge Grants Divorce to Lesbian Couple, then Lets Oversight Stand, CNN.coM, Dec. 12, 2003,
at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Midwest/12/12/lesbian.divorce.ap/ (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). A Connecticut court, however, refused to
dissolve a civil union entered into in Vermont, citing a lack of jurisdiction to dissolve a civil
union. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 174 (Conn. App. 2002).
51. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701, et seq. (2001).
52. Id.
53. Joan Biskupic, Same-sex Couples Redefining Family Law in USA, USA TODAY, Feb. 17,
2003, at A01.
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III. WHY FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS SHOULD BE
EXPANDED TO INCLUDE DOMESTIC PARTNERS
Since the enactment of the FMLA, more than 35,000,000 Ameri-
cans have taken leave for family or medical reasons.54 In 1996, The
Commission on Family and Medical Leave, a Commission estab-
lished by Congress to examine the impact of the FMLA, reported
that the FMLA has become "an important tool in the effort to bal-
ance the demands of family and work."5 The Commission studied
both employers' and employees' experiences with the FMLA; it
found that the FMLA benefited both employers and employees. 6
For example, employers reported experiencing less turnover costs
because employees were able to use the FMLA to attend to family
needs rather than leave their jobs.'7 In addition, the Commission
reported that the demand for the kinds of leave provided among
workers was substantial.' The Commission provided a series of per-
sonal narratives from workers who benefited from the FMLA,
including one from a married man who used the FMLA to care for
his wife when she became ill. This story, from Mr. and Mrs. Fish,
demonstrates the importance of the FMLA:
Walter Fish began taking vacation days from work when his
wife, Debbie, was hospitalized for diabetes complications.
While she was in the hospital, an infection in her right eye ag-
gravated a glaucoma condition, and she lost her vision ... On
February 29, 1995, Walter Fish took FMLA leave ... and
rushed his wife to the W.K. Kellogg Eye Center, in Ann Arbor,
MI. The Eye Center admitted her for four days, where doctors
performed laser surgery on both eyes and glaucoma surgery
on the right eye. Mr. Fish was able to remain with her until
she was released ... When his wife returned home, she was
unable to care for herself or their son. Mr. Fish cooked,
cleaned house and cared for his wife and their child during
her convalescence. On April 3, 1995, a little over a month
later, he was able to return to work ... Mr. Fish said at the
54. S. 304, 108th Cong. § 2 Findings (Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act) (Feb.
3,2003).
55. Id. at Chairman Dodd's Letter.
56. COMM. ON FAM. MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 114-16, 127-30 (1996), available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/whd/fmla/family.htm (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
57. Id. at 127.
58. Id. at 149.
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time: "I feel very strongly about the Family [and Medical]
Leave Act because at my workplace they do have an atten-
dance policy. I would have lost my job ... I feel I helped
strengthen my wife's hopes and determination to keep fight-
ing.'59
Very few people would question whether Mr. Fish should be able
to take time off of work to care for his wife; they are married and
have vowed to support and take care of one another. Yet, if you re-
place Walter with Wanda, the same couple would not be able to use
the FMLA. The following stories involve same-sex couples who are
not protected by the FMLA or their state family and medical leave
laws. These narratives reveal the need to include same-sex domes-
tic partners in federal, state, and local family and medical leave
lawsY6
David has been working for the same employer for twenty-five
years; David and his male partner have been together for twenty-
three years.6' For much of this time, neither David's employer nor
his co-workers knew his sexual orientation. David and his partner
live together in a marriage-like relationship. They share a home
and expenses, and David is covered by his partner's health insur-
ance. David lives and works in a rural area about fifty miles north
of Pittsburgh. One day, while at work, David received the phone
call informing him his partner had suffered a heart attack and
been medically air-lifted into a Pittsburgh hospital. David notified
his boss that he had to leave for personal reasons. The next day he
returned to work, told his boss about the situation, and requested
leave time to care for his partner. David originally asked to use
FMLA time, but his boss said this was not possible because of gov-
ernment regulations. Although his boss was understanding, David
felt discriminated against. David had to use his personal and vaca-
tion days to care for his partner following his heart attack and
surgery. David said that, "in a similar situation of a heterosexual
employee, the offer to use personal days and vacation is never of-
fered. Management immediately processes the time off as FM[A."
62
Had his partner been his spouse, the FMLA would have given him
the right to take the time off to care for his partner.
Jimmy and Brent were dating for seven years and had been liv-
ing together for five. Brent had AIDs and was frequently
59. Id. at 155.
60. Last names and places of employment have been kept confidential to protect their
privacy.
61. Telephone Interview with David K. (Jan. 9, 2003).
62. Id.
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hospitalized. 63 Brent was covered on Jimmy's medical insurance as
his domestic partner, and Jimmy's supervisor was aware of Brent's
illness. Jimmy used personal and vacation time to care for Brent.
Jimmy's boss allowed him to make up any additional time he took
off of work after hours or on weekends. Jimmy was lucky. His su-
pervisor permitted him to take whatever time he needed to care
for his partner. However, Jimmy noted that if he had another su-
pervisor, he may not have been able to take time off of work to care
for his partner. Jimmy said that he was constantly worrying. At
work, he worried how Brent was doing at home. At home he wor-
ried about missing work. Had applying the FMLA been an option,
Jimmy would not have faced these stresses.
Patrick and Paul have been together since March 7, 1999 and
live together in Texas. They were married in a religious ceremony
on July 8, 2000.64 Neither Patrick nor Paul has ever been in a situa-
tion in which he needed to take leave time to care for his partner.
However, they are both active Stonewall Democrats and concerned
with the current state of the law.65 Patrick reports that his employer
provides domestic partner benefits. Patrick believes that under his
employer's policy, it is up to the individual supervisor to decide
whether an employee could take leave to care for a domestic part-
ner. He believes that it would not be a problem if he sought to take
leave to care for Paul. Paul, however, works for a Methodist Hospi-
tal that does not provide any domestic partner benefits. Paul
reports that in his job, he lacks the security of knowing he could
take time to care for Patrick.
Patrick and Paul are planning to adopt a child. Under Texas law,
there is no second-parent adoption: only one of them can be the
legal parent of any child they adopt. Patrick and Paul are con-
cerned that if only one of them were the legal parent and the child
were sick, only one of them could take leave to care for that child.
The state family and medical leave acts that include domestic part-
ners permit either partner to take leave to care for the partner's
child. Paul said, "Patrick is my husband and I will fight until I'm
blue in the face. He is my husband." Patrick said, "All we know is
that we love each other.,
66
A hospital employee posed the following question to a professor
of nursing:
63. Telephone Interview with Jimmy 0. (Feb. 15, 2003).
64. Telephone Interview with Patrick and Paul (Feb. 16, 2003).
65. The Stonewall Democrats are an organization of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans-
gender Democrats.
66. Telephone Interview with Patrick and Paul, supra note 64.
[VOL. 37:3
Expanding the Family and Medical Leave Act
I've worked for the same hospital for 14 years. A few weeks
ago, my domestic partner was critically injured in an auto ac-
cident and I've been at her side ever since. Now my employer
is telling me I must return to work or lose my job. My partner
and I have been together for 20 years, and I won't leave her
until her condition stabilizes. Can my employer legally termi-
nate me while I'm caring for a loved one?
6
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is yes. The FMLA does
not consider an employee's partner of 20 years to be a family
member. The employer has a legal right to terminate this em-
ployee for absenteeism when all she wants to do is be by her
partner's side. This goes against the policy of the FMLA; it requires
workers to choose between their jobs and their domestic partners.
David and his partner, Jimmy and Brent, and Patrick and Paul do
not have the legal protection of their jobs that Mr. Fish has under
the FMLA. As long as federal, state, and local laws do not include
domestic partners, domestic partners have to rely on the policies of
their employers and the kindness of their supervisors. Federal,
state, and local law should protect all families. The law should not
force people to choose between theirjobs and their families.
IV. BARRIERS TO EXPANDING FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS
A. The Legal Definition of Family: The Traditional
Family Values Argument
Those opposed to providing any type of domestic partner bene-
fits often argue that these benefits damage the institution of
marriage. Both the federal government, through the Defense of
Marriage Act, and various court decisions recognize the traditional
family values argument. Congress passed the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) in 1996 as a reaction to Baehr v. Lewin, a case that
could have legalized same-sex marriages in Hawaii." Congress
67. Penny Simpson Brooke, No Time for Domestic Partner, NURSING, Apr. 1, 2002, at 68,
available at 2002 WL 11240748.
68. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In Baehr, the Supreme Court of Hawaii declared that the
ban on same-sex marriage violated the equal rights clause of the Hawaii Constitution. Id.
The court held that unless the state could show that limiting marriage to members of the
opposite sex was justified by compelling state interests and was narrowly drawn "to avoid
unnecessary abridgments of the applicant couples' constitutional rights," the marriage stat-
utes violated the Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 67. The Hawaii Supreme Court vacated and
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feared that if one state recognized same-sex marriages, then other
states would be forced to recognize those marriage. 69 DOMA pro-
vides that the meaning of marriage for purposes of any Act of
Congress or administrative rule, regulation, or interpretation is "a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife."70 DOMA further states that "spouse" "refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 71 Those against
granting marriage-like rights to same-sex couples point to DOMA.
7 2
They argue that DOMA intends to protect the institution of mar-
riage by preventing non-married same-sex couples from obtaining
73the benefits of marriage.
remanded the case. Id. at 68. On remand, the circuit court declared that the state failed to
show a compelling state interest and held that the state had to open its marriage process to
same-sex couples. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996). In response to this decision, Congress passed DOMA. Since the Baehr decisions, Ha-
waii has amended its constitution to limit marriage to members of the opposite sex. At the
same time, however, Hawaii passed the reciprocal beneficiary system to provide some bene-
fits of marriage to same-sex couples. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572-C (Michie 1999).
69. This is in recognition of the maxim that marriages that are valid where celebrated
are valid everywhere, unless the law has declared invalid upon the ground of public policy.
See, e.g., Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v. Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Van-
dever v. Indus. Comm'n of Arizona, 714 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); United States v.
Snyder, 177 F.2d 44, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1949). DOMA makes it national policy that same-sex mar-
riages can be void against public policy.
70. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002). The definition in DOMA is similar to the definitions of "mar-
riage" and "family" in Black's Law Dictionary. Black's Law Dictionary defines "marriage" as
"the legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 986
(7th ed. 1999). Black's Law Dictionary defines "family" as "[a] group consisting of parents
and their children." Id. at 620.
71. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002).
72. Same-sex marriages are recognized in the Netherlands and Belgium; however, the
Defense of Marriage Act does not address marriages entered into outside of the United
States. Belgium Votes to Recognize Gay Marriages, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2003 at 6 (stating that
Belgium became the second country to recognize same-sex marriages after the Netherlands
approved same-sex marriages in 2001); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2002). See also supra note 4. Mar-
riages entered into outside of the United States are often given comity and are voluntarily
recognized by the jurisdictions in the United States. SeeWADLINGTON & O'BRIEN, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, 339-43 (5th ed.). However, in May 2003, in response to a move to legalize same-
sex marriage in Canada, members of the House of Representatives proposed an Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution to define marriage exclusively as "the union of a man
and a woman." H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). In November 2003, Senate proposed the
same amendment. S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003). This proposed Constitutional amend-
ment would preclude any state from recognizing any same-sex marriage performed in any
country and would strip away any of the benefits of marriage that state and local govern-
ments have granted to same-sex couples. See Id.; see also Bill Schneider, Canada Acts on Same-
Sex Marriages, at CNN.coM, June 20, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/
06/20/ip.pol.opinion.canada.marriages/index.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
73. See, e.g., TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION EDUCATION AND LEGAL INSTITUTE, TRA-
DITIONAL VALUES SPECIAL REPORT: SAME-SEX MARRIAGES AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS: ARE
THEY GOOD FOR FAMILIES AND SOCIETY? 1 (2002), available at http://traditionalvalues.org (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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Organizations against domestic partner legislation point to
DOMA, and to the values it represents, to argue against these
benefits. The Traditional Values Coalition, a conservative political
organization that supports Pro-Christian, "Pro-Family" issues while
strongly opposing issues which go against "moral" beliefs stated
that the passage of domestic partnership legislation is bad for chil-
dren, bad for our culture, and that we should not "promote
cohabitation as a positive social good.", 4 They continued that un-
married cohabitation has "weakened marriage and the intact, two-
parent family and thereby damaged our social well-being, espe-
cially that of women and children," and that "our society must not
approve of domestic partnerships."75 Douglas Kmiec, former Dean
of the Catholic University, Columbus School of Law, stated:
Homosexual liaison-like its all too prevalent cultural cohabi-
tation-is not race or gender. It is instead a highly pertinent
moral consideration that cannot be ignored. A society that by
law or practiced condones-nay, encourages-the pursuit of
sexual gratification outside of heterosexual marriage is des-
tined to fall of its own weight.
76
These ideas have gained support in some court decisions. For
example, in Hewitt v. Hewitt, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
recognize that property rights could exist between unmarried op-
posite sex partners. 7 The court found that it was inappropriate for
the court "to grant a legal status to a private arrangement substitut-
ing for the institution of marriage."7 The court reasoned providing
marriage-like benefits to non-marital couples would undermine the
integrity of marriage. The court argued that marriage is a unique
institution and integral to society, and that giving marriage-like
benefits to unmarried persons degrades the institution of mar-
79
riage.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id.
76. Douglas W. Kmiec, Commentary, Gays Need the Helping Hand of Counseling, CHIC.
TRIB., May 5, 1997, at 15.
77. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Il. 1979).
78. Id. at 1209.
79. Id. at 1211.
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B. Cost
Those who originally opposed the FMLA argued that it would
impose too burdensome a cost on American businesses. It is likely
that lawmakers opposed to expanding the FMLA would make simi-
lar arguments. When debating the FMLA, Congressman Istook
stated:
This bill will kill jobs in America. We cannot fool Mother Na-
ture, nor the laws of economics. This bill makes it more
expensive to hire each worker, so businesses will respond by
hiring fewer workers. No matter how noble the goal may be,
this bill artificially raises the price of labor. That makes it
more expensive to operate a business and inflates the price of
everything. This bill requires companies to pay health insur-
ance for 3 months for people who are not working... So, to
those who want to create jobs, this bill says 'adios'. 8°
Senator Orrin Hatch echoed these views, stating that a mandatory
national leave policy would reduce overall employee benefits and
burden small and mid-sized businesses.s
Though opponents to the original FMLA argued that it would
be too costly for American businesses, the Commission on Leave
did not report this effect. The Commission on Leave reported that
employers found the FMLA easy to implement, that it actually re-
duced turnover costs by encouraging employees to remain
employed, and that, overall, it did not increase the cost of running
their businesses. 2 The Commission pointed out that, of all of the
reasons that workers took time off work under the FMLA, caring
for a spouse with a serious, health condition accounted for only
3.7% of leave taken.8 3 If less than four percent of leave takers used
the FMLA to care for spouses with serious health conditions, it is
unlikely that adding domestic partners to the statute would greatly
increase the CoSt.
8 4
80. Family and Medical Leave Act Mandate Does Not Come Free, Feb. 3, 1993, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
81.- Minority Views of Senators Hatch, Kassebaum, Gregg, and Thurmond, S. REP. No.
103-3, at 50-51(1993).
82. COMM. ON FAM. MED. LEAVE, supra note 56, 119, 125-27.
83. Id. at 94.
84. This is especially true considering that only 5,475,768 individuals reported living in
unmarried-partner households. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 19; Smith & Gates, supra
note 21. Compared to the total United States population, it is unlikely that adding up to 5.5
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In addition, most leave time taken to care for a seriously ill
child, spouse, or parent lasts 14 days or fewer.8 5 In fact, if more
workers are encouraged to take leave under the FMLA, they will
feel less like they need to quit their jobs altogether or risk getting
terminated for absenteeism. If Congress expands the FMLA to
cover domestic partners, it will likely benefit workers and employ-
ers the same way that the original FMLA did: it will prevent
turnover and allow workers to feel secure in theirjobs.
V. LIMITING DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS TO SAME-SEX COUPLES
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Many jurisdictions limit domestic partner benefits to same-sex
domestic partners. Some lawmakers contend that there should be a
system that provides the legal benefits of marriage to same-sex
couples because they cannot get married under state law, whereas
opposite-sex domestic partners choose not to get married. s6 The
opposing view, however, is that limiting domestic partner benefits
to same-sex couples violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This is an important issue in developing
family and medical leave policy. Like Vermont and Hawaii, other
jurisdictions may choose to provide an alternative system to
marriage, one that provides the benefits and protections of
marriage only to those who cannot get married under state law.
87
Others, however, like Washington, D.C., may extend family leave
benefits equally to same and opposite sex domestic partners&m It is
million people will greatly add to the cost of FMLA. It is likely that all of these people work
for employers with 50 or more employees, which is necessary to be covered by FMLA.
85. COMM. ON FAM. MED. LEAVE, supra note 56 at 97.
86. This is the reasoning that Vermont followed in adopting civil unions and that Ha-
waii followed when creating the reciprocal beneficiary system. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 572C-1 (Michie 1999) (stating that the purpose of creating the reciprocal beneficiary sys-
tem is to "extend certain rights and benefits which are presently available only to married
couples to couples composed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying
under state law"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (providing that "[p]arties to a civil union
shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities... as are granted to spouses
in a marriage").
87. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204
(2002).
88. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-501(4) (2001). Of the state government, local
government, and quasi-government agencies that offer domestic partner health benefits,
approximately 98 of 191 jurisdictions include both same and opposite sex partners. HRC,
WORKPLACE POLICIES ADVANCED SEARCH, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/
asp-search.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). According
SPRING 2004]
Universty of MichiganJournal of Law Reform
therefore useful to evaluate whether the constitution bars an
extension of benefits that only includes same-sex domestic
partners.
There are three possible arguments that limiting benefits to
same-sex couples violates the Fourteenth Amendment: that doing
so constitutes discrimination based on marital status or sexual ori-
entation, that it violates fundamental rights, and that it constitutes
discrimination based on gender. As discussed in more detail below,
each of these arguments is unlikely to succeed. It would not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment for the federal government, a state, or
a local government to limit its extension of family and medical
leave to same-sex domestic partners. This means that legislators
have the discretion to determine what is best for their jurisdiction
on this issue.
A. Discrimination Based on Marital Status
or Sexual Orientation
To date, only one case has examined whether limiting domestic
partner benefits to same-sex couples violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as discrimination based on
marital status or sexual orientation.89 In Irizarry v. Board of Education
of the City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit upheld a provision extend-
ing health care benefits to same-sex couples but not unmarried
heterosexual couples.90 The court found that the School Board had
rational reasons for limiting the extension of health care benefits
to same-sex domestic partners. 9' Though this case examined health
to the Human Rights Campaign, 191 jurisdictions provide domestic partner health benefits,
and some jurisdictions did not report whether the benefits included same and opposite sex
domestic partners or were limited to same-sex couples. Id.
89. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 251 F3d 604, 604 (2001). In 1999, the Chi-
cago Board of Education extended spousal health care benefits to same-sex domestic
partners. To be eligible for these benefits, the employee and his or her domestic partner
had to be of the same-sex, "unmarried, unrelated, at least 18 years old, and 'each other's
sole domestic partner, responsible for each other's common welfare."' Id. at 606. In addi-
tion, the employee had to show one of the following criteria: that the partners had been
living together for a year, jointly owned a home, jointly owned other property, or that the
domestic partner was the primary beneficiary named in the employee's will. Id. Irizarry's
domestic partner satisfied all of the requirements except being of the same-sex. Id.
90. Id. at 609.
91. Id. at 609-10. The Board of Education made two arguments in defense of its policy.
First, individuals in same-sex partnerships cannot legally get married under Illinois law,
whereas members of the opposite sex could simply obtain these benefits by marrying. Id. at
606. Second, the Board wanted to attract gay and lesbian teachers to the school district as a
means to provide support for gay and lesbian students. Id. The court found that these rea-
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care benefits and not family medical leave, the analysis is the same.
A common reason for extending family medical leave only to same-
sex couples is that same-sex couples cannot marry and therefore
have no other means of obtaining these benefits.9 If other courts
find this to be a rational basis for limiting benefits to same-sex
couples, the classification will likely be upheld. For similar reasons,
an equal protection argument that claims discrimination based on
sexual orientation is unlikely to succeed.9 Under rational basis re-
view, a court will be highly deferential to the legislature. As such, it
is unlikely that a heterosexual will succeed in a claim that the state
illegally discriminated against him or her because of sexual orien-
tation.
B. Fundamental Rights Theory
A statutory classification that substantially interferes with a fun-
damental right is subject to strict scrutiny.94 Conversely, if a law
does not burden a fundamental right, it will be upheld so long as it
"bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."95 The Supreme
Court has found that "choices about marriage, family life, and the
upbringing of children are among associational rights ... [that
are] sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's
unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect."9 6 The Supreme
sons provided a rational basis to limit the health care extension to same-sex domestic part-
ners. Id. at 610.
92. See sources cited supra note 86.
93. The United States Supreme Court recently decided Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). In Lawrence, the petitioners argued that a Texas law, which criminalized sodomy
between persons of the same-sex but not of the opposite sex violated equal protection as
discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation. Lawrence v. State of Texas, 41
S.W.3d 349, 349-50 (Tex. 2001). The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument. See
infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court applied
rational basis to strike down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that discriminated
based on sexual orientation. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). Presumably, courts will continue to
apply rational basis scrutiny to statutes that discriminate based on sexual orientation.
94. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). To be considered a fundamental right,
the classification at issue must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition or
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)
(citation omitted).
95. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
96. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. In Bowers, the Court cites to this line of cases including Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticu 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing and educa-
tion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation). Eisenstadt specifically applied
to the rights of unmarried opposite-sex couples. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Court has not held that an opposite-sex couple has a fundamental
right to cohabit without marrying.97 If a court finds that living to-
gether in an unmarried relationship is a fundamental right, then
the denial of family and medical leave benefits must substantially
interfere with exercising that right for the statute to be struck
down.9 If a state does not provide family and medical leave benefits
to opposite-sex cohabitants, it will not substantially interfere with
the right to cohabit. Denying family medical leave benefits to op-
posite-sex couples does not prevent opposite-sex domestic partners
from cohabiting; the only interference is that the state refuses to
provide family medical leave. As such, the right to cohabit and en-
ter into that family relationship is not substantially limited.
C. Discrimination Based on Gender
There is some question as to whether such a classification dis-
criminates based on gender. The argument is that the government
entity that denies benefits to unmarried opposite-sex couples does
so because the person seeking the benefit is of the opposite-sex as
his or her partner. Thus, the gender of the applicant causes the
state to deny the benefits. If a court finds that limiting domestic
partner benefits to same-sex couples is discrimination based on
gender, then the policy will be subject to intermediate scrutiny.99
For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection
scrutiny, the defendant must establish that the challenged classifi-
cation serves "'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives'."1°° Based on the following analy-
sis, limiting family and medical leave laws to same-sex domestic
partners is not gender discrimination and will not trigger interme-
diate scrutiny.
Some commentators argue that limiting domestic partner bene-
fits to same-sex couples amounts to discrimination based on
association and should be prohibited under Title VII of the Civil
97. In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court addressed whether a state could prevent opposite-
sex unmarried couples from obtaining contraception, while providing opposite-sex married
couples access to contraception. 405 U.S. at 443 (stating "[a] prohibition on contraception
per se violates the rights of single persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment").
98. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387.
99. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
100. Id. (citation omitted).
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Rights Act of 1964.01 Since Title VII is an exercise of Congress's
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, this ar-
gument is important for analyzing this issue. Cases that analyzed
this issue have generally arisen in the context of interracial mar-
riage. These cases found that the employer did discriminate
against the employee because of his or her race; had the employee
been of the same race as his or her spouse the discrimination
would not have occurred. °2 It is possible that, by analogy, the same
argument can succeed for an opposite-sex domestic partner. If the
government denies benefits to opposite-sex partners that it grants
to same-sex domestic partners, the basis for discrimination is the
association with a member of the opposite sex.'03 To date, no court
has interpreted an extension of benefits to be gender discrimina-
tion along these lines. Instead, courts that have addressed these
issues have found that men and women are treated equally and
that the distinction is based on either sexual orientation or marital
status, which is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
0 4
101. Paul R. Lynd, Domestic Partner Benefits Limited to Same-Sex Couples: Sex Discrimination
Under Title V1, 6 WM. & MARYJ. OF WOMEN & L. 561 (2000).
102. See Gresham v. Waffle House, 586 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (finding
that a white employee who alleged that her employer terminated her because she was mar-
ried to a black man stated a cause of action for race discrimination under Title VII: "but for
[their] being white, the plaintiffs in these cases would not have been discriminated
against"); Erwin v. Mister Omelet of America, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5119, *10
(M.D.N.C. 1991) (finding a black man who alleged employment discrimination based on his
relationship with a white woman stated a cause of action under Title VII).
103. See Lynd, supra note. 101, at 603. In the context of domestic partner benefits, the
sex of the individual seeking the benefit caused the discriminatory treatment. If, for exam-
ple, a man seeks to take family medical leave to care for his seriously ill female domestic
partner and that benefit is denied, he may argue that if he were female then he would be
entitled to take leave. Id. See also Debbie Zielinski, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Why Not Offer
them to Same-Sex Partners and Unmarried Opposite Sex Partners? 13 J.L. & HEALTH 281, 318
(1999) (stating that "an unmarried heterosexual couple ... may attempt to argue an equal
protection violation based on gender discrimination ... [because] the only reason for the
denial of benefits to the opposite-sex couple is the fact that one of the partners in the rela-
tionship is of a different gender than the other").
104. There are no cases that analyze whether providing domestic partner benefits that
are limited to same-sex partners violates equal protection as discrimination based on gender.
However, two federal courts considered whether such extensions violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as discrimination based on sex: Foray v. Bell Atlantic, 56 F. Supp. 2d.
327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), and Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68 E. Supp.-2d. 963 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Both
cases found that the extensions did not violate Title -VII as discrimination based on gender.
In Foray, the plaintiff employee claimed that Bell Atlantic's employee benefits policy, which
provided employees in same-sex relationships with health care benefits equivalent to those
enjoyed by married couples, violated Title VII as discrimination based on sex. Foray, 56 F.
Supp. 2d. at 329. Foray, who had an opposite-sex domestic partner, alleged that he and his
partner met all of the criteria for receiving benefits except for being of the same sex. Id. The
complainant claimed thatif. he were a woman, his domestic partner would be an eligible
dependent under the employers benefits plan. Id. The court rejected this argument and
found that the policy did not discriminate based on gender. Id. at-330. In Cleaves v. City of
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A family and medical leave law for same-sex domestic partners
would be more likely to be found unconstitutional had the Su-
preme Court found that the Texas sodomy law at issue in Lawrence
v. Texas unlawfully discriminated based on gender.05 The statute at
issue in Lawrence made it a criminal offense to engage in sodomy
with a person of the same sex, but did not criminalize sodomy be-
tween persons of the opposite sex. 06 The appellants argued that
the statute discriminated based on sexual orientation and gender,
in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.0 7 The Texas Supreme Court rejected both of these
arguments. s08 When it rejected the gender argument, the court
found that the statute applied equally to men and women, and
therefore did not "impose burdens or benefits upon a particular
gender.'
The court stated that because the statute was gender-neutral on
its face, it did not have an adverse impact on one gender, and that
even if it did, that the impact could not be traced to a discrimina-
tory purpose." In reversing the Texas Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court did not find that the statute unlawfully dis-
criminated based on sex."' Instead, the Supreme Court held that
the statute was unconstitutional under the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 The Court stated, "the case in-
volve [s] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual life-
Chicago, the employer terminated the plaintiff, a probationary employee, for calling in sick
because of the death of his fianc6's stepfather. Cleaves, 68 F. Supp. 2d. at 966. The plaintiff
employee claimed that this violated Title VII because "had he been 'an unmarried woman
... the City would have granted him paid leave due to the death of the father of his female
domestic partner."' Id. The court rejected this argument, calling it "creative and clever but
incorrect." Id. at 967. The court found that the ordinance did not treat men differently than
women, but instead, "treatfed] unmarried same-sex couples differently from unmarried
opposite-sex couples." Id. The court found that the plaintiff did not state a claim for dis-
crimination based on sex and that though the ordinance did discriminate, it did so lawfully
on the basis of marital status. Id.
105. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2001) (cert. granted 123 S. Ct. 661 (2002)).
See also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
106. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2001). The appellants, John Lawrence and
Tyron Garner, were convicted of engaging in homosexual conduct. They challenged the
constitutionality of Section 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code, claiming it "offends the equal
protection and privacy guarantees by both the state and federal constitutions." Id. at 350.
The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the statute. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 354 (The court first found that Texas had a rational basis for criminalizing
homosexual sodomy, namely, preserving public morals.).
109. Id. at 359.
110. Id.
111. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
112. Id.
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style ... the State cannot demean their existence or control .their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right
to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the govern-
ment. 11 3 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to find that laws
that treat same-sex partners differently from opposite-sex partners
made an unlawful classification based on sex, similar to the race
association cases discussed above. ' 4 Because the Court did not so
hold, it is presumable that a court will hold that a law based on
sexual orientation is not an unlawful classification based on sex.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence, which was based on
the Equal Protection Clause, also failed to find gender discrimina-
tion in the Texas statute." 5 Justice O'Connor argued that the
classification could not survive rational basis scrutiny because it
irrationally discriminated based on sexual orientation; O'Connor
did not approach this as discrimination based on sex."r6 This is in
line with earlier cases where litigants argued that harassment based
on sexual orientation did not have a claim under Title VII for sex
discrimination. In February 2002, the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari to a Third Circuit case that held that an employee who
alleged harassment based on his sexual orientation did not have a
claim under Title VII for gender discrimination.'17 In that case,
Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., the Third Circuit pointed
out that Title VII does provide a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment so long as that harassment is because of the sex of the
employee and not because of his or her sexual orientation. ' 8 Since
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bibby, the Court presuma-
bly agreed that such harassment based solely on sexual orientation
is not discrimination based on gender under Title VII. Based on
Bibby and the approach taken in Lawrence, it is unlikely that limiting
family and medical leave laws to same-sex domestic partners will be
found unconstitutional discrimination based on sex.
113. Id. at 2484.
114. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
115. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
116. Id.
117. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d. Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534
U.S. 1155 (2002).
118. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
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VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS THAT FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS PROVIDE
A. The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
The FM[A allows eligible employees who work for any employer
with fifty or more employees to take up to twelve work-weeks of
unpaid leave during any twelve month period; the leave may be
used for the birth of a child, to care for a child, to adopt or take in
a foster child, to care for his or her spouse, child, or parent who
has a serious health condition, or because of the employee's own
serious health condition."9 An eligible employee is an employee
who has been employed "for at least 12 months by the employer
with respect to whom leave is requested." 120 The FMLA defines a
"serious health condition" as "an illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves," either "inpatient care
in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility, or con-
tinuing treatment by a health care provider.','
1
Under the FMLA, leave may be taken intermittently if the em-
ployer agrees or when it is medically necessary. 22 In addition, the
employer may require that employees first exhaust any vacation,
personal time, or other paid or unpaid leave that the employer
provides before going out on FMLA leave. 23 Upon return from
leave, the employer must restore the employee to his or her posi-
tion or to an equivalent position with equivalent "benefits, pay and
other terms and conditions of employment."
2 4
119. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1)(A)-(D) (2002) (setting forth the leave requirements under
FMLA); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (defining employer as "any person engaged in commerce or
any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each
working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year").
120. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i) (2002).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2002).
122. 29U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) (2002).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d) (2002).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2002).
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B. Following the Lead from Existing State Family and
Medical Leave Laws that Include Domestic Partners:
An Examination of the Benefits these Laws Provide
Currently, four jurisdictions provide family medical leave bene-
fits similar to those provided under the FMLA; these apply to both
public and private sector employees."5 In addition, Delaware pro-
vides an administrative regulation allowing public employees to use
their sick or other leave time to care for a domestic partner with a
serious health condition. 26 These statutes vary in how they define
domestic partner, whether they include both same and opposite
sex domestic partners, the length of leave-which ranges from four
weeks to sixteen weeks-and whether the leave is paid, unpaid, or
both. However, they all apply to both public and private sector em-
ployees. The chart in the Appendix summarizes the variations in
each family and medical leave law.
VII. WHAT POLICY MAKERS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHEN
WRITING FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS
The federal, state, and local governments should expand their
family and medical leave laws by following the guidelines discussed
in this Part. There are a number of questions that need to be ad-
dressed when formulating a family and medical leave law. The first
step is to determine how to define domestic partners. How does a
couple establish that they are domestic partners and not simply
roommates? Should the laws include same and opposite sex do-
mestic partners? Second, should these laws apply to public and
private sector employees? Third, how much leave time should
these laws provide? Fourth, should employers be required to have a
minimum number of employees before family leave laws apply to
them? Fifth, should these laws cover both a domestic partner and
the domestic partner's child? This Part looks at each of these fac-
tors, and recommends a family leave plan that combines the best
125. Vermont, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Oregon family medical leave laws
cover both private and public sector employees. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472 (2002); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 32-502 (2001); HAWAI REV. STAT. ANN. § 398-3 (Michie 1999); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.159 (2002). In addition, California recently passed a temporary disability program
that will become effective on January 1, 2004. 2002 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 901 (Deering
2002). Under this law, an employee may take up to six weeks paid leave to care for a domes-
tic partner with a serious health condition. Id.
126. DEL. CODE REGS. 10-450-002 (2002).
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attributes of the family and medical leave laws shown in the chart
in the Appendix.
A. Defining Domestic Partners
When Representative Maloney proposed to amend the FMLA to
permit workers to take leave time to care for domestic partners
with serious health conditions, the proposed amendment did not
include a definition of domestic partners.2 7 To maintain the legis-
lative intent and spirit of family and medical leave laws, it is
important that the law protect people in functional family relation-
ships and not those who are just roommates. One way to do this is
to look at the functions of a family and to formulate a statute that
encompasses functions.
Common criteria used by states to establish whether couples
meet the requirements to become domestic partners include:- 28
1. The partners share a common residence;2 9
2. The partners are jointly responsible for living ex-
130
penses;
3. The partners are above 18 years of age;"'
4. The persons are not related by blood in a manner
that would prevent them from getting married un-
der state law;
3 2
5. Neither person is married or a member of another
domestic partnership; 3
127. Family and Medical Leave Inclusion Act, H.R. 1430, 108th Cong. (2003). The
amendment proposed in the 107th Congress did not include a definition of domestic part-
ner either. To Amend the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, H.R. 2287, 107th Cong.
(2002).
128. These criteria are taken from the California, Hawaii, and Vermont laws relating to
domestic partnerships, reciprocal beneficiaries, and civil unions respectively. See CAL. FAM.
CODE § 297(b) (6) (B) (2002); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie 1999); VT. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 15, § 1204(e) (12) (2002). Another approach is the New York rent control ordinance,
which looks at the functions of the particular couple. See Richardson, supra note 37.
129. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b) (6) (B) (2002) (partners must share a common resi-
dence); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-501(4) (C) (2001) (the couple must share or have shared a
mutual residence within the last year).
130. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (2002).
131. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (2002); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C4 (Michie
1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(12) (2002).
132. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (2002); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie
1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(12) (2002).
133. California, Hawaii, and Vermont each have this requirement, however, the lan-
guage is some what different for each state. In Hawaii, neither of the parties can be a party
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6. Both persons are mentally capable of consenting to
the partnership; 4
7. The partners register as domestic partners pursuant
to state law;1
3 5
8. The parties consent and consent was not obtained
by fraud, force, or duress; and 36
9. The partners are legally prohibited from marrying
one another.'
37
Vermont, Hawaii, California, and Oregon limit coverage under
family and medical leave laws to same-sex domestic partners while
Delaware and the District of Columbia include same and opposite
sex domestic partners.' 8 The Code of Delaware Regulations pro-
vides that immediate family includes "spouse, domestic partner...
son or daughter of the employee's spouse or domestic partner and
any minor child for whom the employee has assumed and carries
to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie
1999). In Vermont, neither party can be a party to another civil union. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1204(e)(12) (2002). To dissolve a Vermont civil union, the parties must obtain a di-
vorce in the same manner that a married couple would go through under state law. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e) (12) (2002).
134. Both California and Vermont have these requirements. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 297(b)(6)(B) (2002). To enter into a civil union in Vermont, the parties must meet the
criteria and obligations set forth in title 18, chapter 106 of the Vermont Statutes. These
requirements are similar to those required to obtain a marriage license, and include, apply-
ing with a town clerk, proof of the legal qualifications to a civil union, and restrictions on
minors and other incompetent persons. VT. STAT. ANN tit. 18, §§ 5160-5169 (2002).
135. In California, each partner must file a "declaration of Domestic Partnership with
the Secretary of State." CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b) (6) (B) (a) (2002). In Hawaii, the individu-
als must sign a declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 572C-4 (Michie 1999). In Vermont, the parties must enter into a legally binding civil un-
ion. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e) (12) (2002).
136. This requirement is unique to Hawaii. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie
1999).
137. California, Hawaii, and Vermont all include this requirement. California requires
that either: (A) both persons are members of the same sex or (B) one or both persons meet
the eligibility criteria under Title II of the Social Security Act. In most cases, to qualify as
domestic partners, the parties must be members of the same sex. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 297(b) (6) (B) (2002). To enter into a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship, the parties
"must be legally prohibited from marrying one another." HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4
(Michie 1999). Similarly, to enter into a civil union, the parties must be of the same sex and
excluded from the states marriage laws. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(12) (2002). Finally,
the Oregon Administrative Regulation that interprets the family leave law states that "family
member means spouse, same-sex domestic partner ... parent of same-sex domestic partner
... [and] the child of an employee's same-sex domestic partner." OR. ADMIN. R. 839-009-
0210 (2002).
138. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b) (6) (B) (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Michie
1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(12) (2002); DEL. CODE REGS. 10 450 002 (2002); D.
C. CODE ANN. § 32-501 (4) (A)-(C) (2002).
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out parental responsibility.', 3 9 The regulation then defines domes-
tic partner as "a person with whom the employee's life is
interdependent, with whom the employee maintains a committed
relationship and with whom the employee shares a mutual resi-
dence.
"
1
4
0
The Delaware regulation does not require partners to meet spe-
cific criteria like those in the statues described above. Similarly, the
Washington, D.C., law that permits employees to take leave to care
for family members defines family member as:
(A) A person to whom the employee is related by blood, legal
custody, or marriage; (B) a child who lives with an employee
and for whom the employee permanently assumes and dis-
charges parental responsibility; or (C) a person with whom
the employee shares or has shared, within the last year, a mu-
tual residence and with whom the employee maintains a
committed relationship.-
4
1
Though "committed relationship" is not defined in the D.C. Family
and Medical Leave Act, the D.C. Health Care Benefits Expansion
defines committed relationship as "a familial relationship between
2 individuals characterized by mutual caring and the sharing of a
mutual residence."'42 This definition is not gender specific and, like
Delaware's, does not require that the partners meet statutory crite-
ria.
143
To best accomplish the goal of including domestic partners in
family and medical leave laws, the partners should have to register
139. DEL. CODE REGS. 10 450 002 (2002).
140. Id.
141. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-501(4) (A)-(C) (2001).
142. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701 (2001). The Health Care Benefits Expansion Act estab-
lishes the D.C. domestic partnership registration and termination procedures and provides
that District employees that register as domestic partners are entitled to family member
benefits provided by the District government, including leave time to care for a family
member under section 32-502. §§ 32-701 to 705. To register as domestic partners, each part-
ner must affirm that he or she is above 18 years old, is the sole domestic partner of the other
person, and is not married. § 32-702(a).
143. Private sector employees do not have to meet any specific requirements. However,
employees of the District do have to register as domestic partners in order to use their leave
time to care for an ill domestic partner under the D.C. Code. Compare § 32-502, which
provides that an employee is entitled to 16 weeks of leave to care for a family member who
has a serious health condition, with § 32-705, which provides that a District employee shall
be granted sick leave to care for a family member as defined in § 32-701(7). § 32-701(7)
defines family member to include domestic partner or a dependent child of a domestic
partner and § 32-701(4) defines domestic partner as "the relationship between two persons
who become domestic partners by registering in accordance with § 32-702." D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 32-701 (4).
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as domestic partners pursuant to the laws of their jurisdiction or
make some form of attestation as to their status, under penalty of
perjury, before they can benefit from these laws. Just as married
couples have to get a marriage certificate before obtaining the
benefits of marriage, individuals who want to obtain the benefits of
domestic partnership should have to take affirmative steps to have
their relationship legally recognized.1 44 The domestic partners
should also be required to take formal steps to dissolve the rela-
tionship, similar to a divorce. Containing a mechanism to legally
dissolve the relationship ensures that the couple will no longer re-
ceive the benefits once they break up.45 Although some may fear
that people may register fraudulently just to obtain the benefits,
requiring attestation under penalty of perjury and requiring a for-
mal process to dissolve the relationship makes the relationship
harder to enter and exit and should protect against fraud.
The statutory mechanism used to recognize the legal relation-
ship, whether a registry or other, less formal, means, should
include specific statutory criteria that the partners need to meet to
146qualify as domestic partners. The most important criteria are
those requiring the partners to demonstrate that they are in a
committed relationship and not simply roommates. These criteria
may include being jointly responsible for expenses and sharing a
residence. The statute should also contain the criteria typically re-
quired before individuals can get married. These include being
above the legal age to get married in the state, not being related by
blood in a manner that would prevent them from getting married
under state law, being capable of giving consent, and not being a
member of another domestic partnership.
144. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002). In Vermont, the requirements to ob-
tain a marriage license and to obtain a civil union certificate are virtually the same. Id. Both
require that the couple fill out an application, submit it to a town clerk, obtain a license, and
have the marriage or civil union solemnized by a Justice of the Peace or other person au-
thorized to perform a marriage ceremony. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5160 (2002).
145. The Vermont civil union statute, for example, requires that the couples formally
dissolve the relationship in a divorce-like proceeding. VT. STAT. ANN tit. 15, § 1206 (2002).
146. Many private employers that provide domestic partner benefits require workers to file
an affidavit of domestic partnership or spousal equivalency, which requires that the employee
personally sign a declaration for his employer that he or she is in a domestic partner relationship.
For example, at Fox, Inc., employees must sign an Affidavit of Marriage/Spousal Equivalency
declaring that the employee and his or her spousal equivalent (1) have lived together for at least
six months and intend to do so permanently, (2) are not related by blood to a degree of closeness
that would prohibit legal marriage, (3) are mutually responsible for expenses, (4) are of the age
of consent, and (5) are not married to anyone else. Fox also requires that if the employee lives in
ajurisdiction that permits registration of domestic partners, that the employee so registers. HRC,
Fox, INC., AFF. or MARRIAGE/SPOuSAL EQuIvALENcy, available at http://www.hrc.org/Tem-
plate.cfm?Section=The.-Issues&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDispay.cfm&ContentI
D=1 1101 (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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Once the couple becomes legally recognized domestic partners
by registering as domestic partners, the family and medical leave
statute may define domestic partner as "a person with whom an
individual has registered as a domestic partner in his or her state
or political subdivision, having met all of the legal requirements
for registration." Domestic partner registries may be more effi-
cient. If, in the future, the jurisdiction provides a new benefit to
domestic partners, lawmakers will not have to specifically define
domestic partners in that statute. Future legislation can state that it
applies to those registered as domestic partners pursuant to the
registration laws.
However, if a jurisdiction does not have a domestic partner reg-
istry and wants to amend its family and medical leave law without
first creating a registry, lawmakers should draft a more specific
definition that encompasses the criteria discussed above. A couple
should have to declare under penalty of perjury that it meets the
criteria and should have to file formal documents if the partner-
ship dissolves. Drafting the definition with specific requirements
under penalty of perjury should prevent fraud by discouraging
those who are not truly domestic partners from seeking benefits.
The final issue regarding the definition of domestic partner is to
determine whether the law should require that partners be those
who are legally prohibited from marrying under state law. From a
policy perspective, there are good reasons to limit family and leave
benefits to same-sex domestic partners and there are good reasons
to include both same- and opposite-sex domestic partners. The
strongest argument to support limiting domestic partner benefits
to same-sex couples is that because same-sex couples cannot get
married there ought to be a mechanism for same-sex couples to
obtain the legal benefits of marriage.1 47 In comparison, the benefits
of marriage are not permanently out of reach for heterosexual co-
habitants. As one commentator noted, "[u]nmarried heterosexual
couples claiming status as domestic partners seek the economic
benefits of marriage without the social responsibilities. Achieving
this end would require that marriage obligations become inde-
147. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 2000) (stating "[w]e hold that the
State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law"). Whether this ultimately takes the
form of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel "domestic partnership"
system or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature. Whatever system is
chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters
common benefit, protection, and security of the law.
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pendent of marriage rewards." 8 Limiting family and medical leave
benefits to same-sex domestic partners supports the goal of provid-
ing an alternative system to marriage for same-sex couples, similar
to the civil union system in Vermont.
Advocates of broad domestic partnership policies argue that the
right to privacy and notions of individual freedom require that
people who care for one another and choose not to get married
should not be discriminated against for that choice. 49 The Alterna-
tives to Marriage Project, an organization that advocates for the
extension of domestic partner benefits to same- and opposite-sex
domestic partners equally, asserts that "it is essential to recognize,
embrace, and support the family diversity that exists today."50 The
argument is that there should be no moral or legal distinction be-
tween unmarried couples and "[a]ny relationship between two
unrelated, loving adults is as worthy as any other such relation-
ship."
5 1
Both sides present strong arguments. On the one hand, oppo-
site-sex cohabiting couples who choose not to get married make
the decision not to avail themselves of the benefits of marriage.
Why should those couples be entitled to the benefits of marriage
without taking on the social responsibilities of marriage? On the
other hand, people have good reasons for not getting married-
maybe they do not believe in the institution of marriage, had a bad
experience with a previous marriage and do not want to get mar-
ried again, or do not believe that the state should be interfering
with and regulating their personal and intimate affairs. These cou-
ples also function as families, have all of the appearances of
married couples, and only lack a piece of paper affirming the valid-
ity of the relationship. Policy makers must make the ultimate
decision that is best for their jurisdictions, whether on the federal,
state, or local level.
148. James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex
Couples, 8 LAW & SEx. 649, 657 (1998).
149. See THE ALTERNATIVE TO MARRIAGE PROJECT, AFFIRMATION OF FAMILY DIVERSITY,
available at http://www.unmarried.org/family.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
150. Id.
151. Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Cou-
ples in Domestic Partnership Laws and Ordinances, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2002).
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B. Family and Medical Leave Laws Should Apply to
Public and Private Sector Employees
State and local family and medical leave laws should mirror the
FMLA. To protect the greatest number of workers possible, family
and medical leave laws should apply to both the public and private
sector. In addition, the Supreme Court recently found that Con-
gress properly abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in
the FMLA and that states may be sued for money damages 152 It is
important that state family leave laws provide benefits to state em-
ployees and permit these employees to sue for damages, just as
they would be able to do if the federal FMLA covered domestic
partners. Otherwise, workers who are denied family leave time will
not be able to sue for damages and may be discouraged from seek-
ing leave.
C. Family and Medical Leave Laws Should Follow the FMLA
and Provide At Least Twelve Weeks of Leave
The Federal FMLA provides up to twelve weeks of leave time. As
such, every state should provide at least twelve weeks of leave in its
statute. For example, the Hawaii family leave law only provides four
weeks of leave. Though this law does include reciprocal beneficiar-
ies, because the federal law provides a greater amount of leave,
reciprocal beneficiaries receive eight weeks less leave time than
married couples receive under the FMLA. If a state is going to in-
clude domestic partners in its family leave laws, it should provide
the same amount of leave that the federal law provides. This is es-
pecially important if progress continues at the state level, but not at
the federal level. It ensures that domestic partners and married
couples are entitled to the same amount of leave under federal and
state law.
152. Hibbs v. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (holding that Congress
properly abrogated state sovereign immunity in enacting-the FMLA under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Generally, the Eleventh Amendment.grants states immunity from
private damage actions in federal court. However, Congress is authorized to abrogate Elev-
enth Amendment immunity to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment if Congress dots so expressly in the statute or it is evidenced through the legis-
lative history or statutory intent. See generally Todd B. Tatelman, Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs: The Eleventh Amendment in a State's Rights Era: Sword or Shield? 52 CATH. U.
L. REv. 683, 688-90 (2003).
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D. Family and Medical Leave Laws Should Mirror the FMLA and
Apply to Employers with Fifty or More Employees
Following the same reasoning, the size of the employers covered
under state law should be at least the same size as the federal
FMLA provides. Since the FMLA covers employers with fifty or
more employees, the state laws should at least cover the same sized
employers. If the states want to include a greater number of em-
ployers within the ambit of the statutes coverage, they are free to
do so. If states mirror federal law, then if a state includes domestic
partners in its statute, the domestic partners will be entitled to
leave on the same terms as married couples. The federal law
should be a floor and not a ceiling.
E. Wage Replacement
Wage replacement is still unknown in the United States. Because
the California law did not take effect until January, 2004, there is
not yet data on how costly it is or how it may affect employees. Al-
though the Commission on Leave pointed out that many
employees needed but did not take family and medical leave be-
cause of financial restraints,' 53 the fact that the cost is not known
may prevent lawmakers from taking this step. One possible ap-
proach is to wait and see how the California law works once it takes
effect. Once the impact on employers is more ascertainable, other
jurisdictions can follow California's lead.
F Family and Medical Leave Laws Should Cover Both the
Domestic Partner and His or Her Children
Family and medical leave laws that permit employees to take
leave to care for domestic partners with serious health conditions
should also permit those employees to use leave to care for his or
her domestic partners children. This is because in most states sec-
ond parent adoption is not recognized, and therefore children
cannot have two legal parents of the same sex. It is in the best in-
terests of the child to allow either parent, or the parent's domestic
153. COMM. ON FAM. MED. LEAVE, supra note 56, at 99.
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partner that acts similarly to a step-parent and is a caretaker for
that child, to take time off work to care for that child. If, for exam-
ple, the child's legal parent has a higher salary than his or her
domestic partner, it would be better for the family as a whole if the
non-parent partner was able to take leave to care for the child.
Washington, D.C., takes this approach, defining "family member"
to include both a domestic partner and the dependent children of
a domestic partner. 54 This recognizes the family unit as a whole
and notjust the couple itself.
VIII. CONCLUSION: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS SHOULD
RECOGNIZE MODERN FUNCTIONAL FAMILIES BY
PROTECTING DOMESTIC PARTNERS
Family and medical leave laws provide significant benefits to
workers. However, under current federal and most state laws, some
families are excluded from protection under these laws. In recent
years, many states have begun to recognize domestic partners as
functional families and have provided these families with some of
the benefits of marriage. Domestic partners, just as married cou-
ples, are one another's family. The purposes of family and medical
leave are best accomplished by including domestic partners. The
federal government, state, and local governments should continue
this development by expanding family and medical leave to in-
clude domestic partners.
To accomplish this goal, lawmakers should look at the current
state laws that include domestic partners and take the best attrib-
utes of those laws to draft one for their jurisdiction. A family and
medical leave law that includes domestic partners must be specific.
It must define domestic partners in a detailed manner to prevent
fraud or require that the individuals first register as domestic part-
ners pursuant to state or local law. These laws must at least mirror,
if not go beyond, federal law. State family and medical leave laws
should not provide less leave time or cover less employers than the
federal law to ensure uniformity between state and federal law.
Every married person fears that he or she will one day get a
phone call saying that a husband or wife has been in accident and
needs immediate medical attention. Since the FMLA, most mar-
ried persons know that they can be with their spouses during this
time of medical need. They can be by their side at the hospital or
154. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701(7)(A)-(B) (2001).
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take time from work to help a spouse recover. Domestic partners
are families: they too need the protection of family and medical
leave laws and the security that their jobs will be safe when facing
this type of family emergency.
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